In 1959, Muller and Bartky published a celebrated paper on \A Theory of Asynchronous Circuits". Among many novel techniques in that paper was the use of lattices resembling the domains of con gurations of event structures. In the light of this we present a generalization of Muller's construction to safe nets. We nd, however, that this \Muller unfolding" cannot be generated as the domain of con gurations of any known event structure, not even a General Event Structure. (In particular, this unfolding di ers from that of Nielsen, Plotkin and Winskel.) This paper attempts to ll that gap. We make use of the logical approach to causality in which a General Event Structure is interpreted as a \logical automaton" arising from a particular logic of causality. We introduce a new causal logic and associate a corresponding logical automaton to any nite safe Petri net. Our main result is that the domain of con gurations of this generalized event structure is isomorphic to the Muller unfolding of the net.
Introduction
In 1959, Muller and Bartky published \A Theory of Asynchronous Circuits" in which they used lattice theory to study the behaviour of clock-free digital circuits, 9]. This paper is remarkable not only for its analysis of a di cult real-world problem but also for the introduction of concepts and methods which were far in advance of their time. In particular, the lattices used by Muller and Bartky are closely related to the domains of con gurations of event structures, although, of course, they were not recognized as such at the time.
In this paper we de ne and study an analogous construction to Muller's but in a context which is more familiar to concurrency theory: 1-safe Petri nets. The intuition behind Muller's lattice construction is that the elements of the lattice not only represent states of the corresponding circuit but also count the number of times a given wire in the circuit has experienced a change of voltage level (from 0 to 1 or vice versa). This idea is quite natural from the perspective of an electronic engineer. An oscilloscope probe placed in a circuit will faithfully record the rises and falls in the voltage level on a single wire and it is straightforward for an electronic observer to count these. Our construction for nets, builds a poset, which no longer has to be a lattice, whose elements count the number of times each transition in the net res. We refer to this poset as the Muller unfolding of the net.
Similar constructions have recently appeared in the literature on asynchronous circuit design, 16] . We hope that the treatment we present here will clarify some of the di culties with these constructions, which we discuss further in x2.
The idea of counting rings of transitions appears to be new to concurrency theory. For example, Nielsen, Plotkin and Winskel, 10] , also construct an unfolding of a safe net and we observe in x2 that this does not coincide with the Muller construction. Indeed, we shall point out in x2 that not even a General Event Structure, of the type considered by Winskel in 14], is capable of generating the Muller poset. This leads us to ask whether there is some generalized event structure which is able to capture it. That is the problem which we address in this paper. In earlier work, 4, 5], we developed a logical approach to causality which allows us to interpret Winskel's General Event Structures as arising from a speci c logic of causality, 4, Theorem 4.1]. By choosing a di erent logic, we can build a class of generalized event structures. In this paper we suggest an appropriate logic, L 3 , which we show to be su cient to build a generalized event structure|a so-called L 3 -automaton|which captures the Muller poset. This is our main result.
We believe this paper has two main contributions. Firstly, it introduces to concurrency theory some ideas arising from practical problems in circuit design which have not been discussed and studied before in an abstract setting. Secondly, we have argued elsewhere, 4, 3] , that causality still presents some di cult unresovled questions and that we are far from a de nitive understanding of it. The Muller unfolding presents us with a family of awkward examples which force us towards a deeper understanding of causality. We believe this interplay between engineering practice and mathematical theory is important for the health of both subjects.
In the next section we consider Muller's construction in the context of a simple electrical circuit and use this to motivate our construction for Petri nets. In x3 we give a background sketch of the logical approach to causality developed in 4, 5] in su cient detail to motivate our candidate logic of causality, L 3 . Finally, in x4, we explain how to build an L 3 -automaton from a safe net and give a sketch of the proof of the main result. Full details can be found in 6]. This paper arose out of questions posed by Vadim Kotov and Lucy Cherkasova during a visit by the author to the Institute of Informatics Systems in Novosibirsk in 1991. The author gratefully acknowledges many discussions, then and subsequently, which laid the foundations of the present paper. Thanks are due to Alex Yakovlev for introducing the author to asynchronous circuits and for stimulating a detailed study of Muller's ideas. Mogens Nielsen has helped to develop the subject of Muller unfoldings and the author is grateful to him for many insightful discussions on that subject. Finally, thanks are due to four anonymous referees whose comments led to improvements in the presentation of this work. The work described here was undertaken as part of project STETSON, a joint project between Hewlett-Packard Laboratories and Stanford University on asynchronous circuit design.
The Muller unfolding
The diagram below shows a closed asynchronous circuit composed of two inverters and a Muller C-element. This is identical to Muller's Figure 2, For given voltage levels on the wires x 1 , x 2 and x 3 , these equations describe the new voltage levels, x 0 1 , x 0 2 , x 0 3 , caused by the circuit components. Muller's famous C-element remembers its previous value until its inputs have both gone high or both gone low, at which point it changes value. C-elements are frequently used in asynchronous designs.
The behaviour of this circuit can be represented by the transition diagram (2) . The nets we deal with in this paper will all be nite (ie: both B and A will be nite) and 1-safe. The nite 1-safe net shown below will be our running example. 
Muller counted changes in voltage level. We intend to count rings of transitions. The easiest way to count the transitions on a trace s is to use the multiset s] which can be thought of as a vector of numbers indexed by the names of the transitions. This is similar to Muller 
The Hasse diagram of the Muller unfolding of example (3) is shown in (4) . Since N has only 3 transitions, a, b and c, we have used the simpli ed notation (i; j; k) to denote the multiset l for which l(a) = i, l(b) = j and l(c) = k. We can make some simple deductions from this example. The states (1; 1; 0) and (1; 0; 1) both cover the state (1; 0; 0). But the least upper bound of (1; 1; 0) and (1; 0; 1) is clearly (2; 1; 1) which does not cover either (1; 1; 0) or (1; 0; 1). This means that mul(N) cannot be an event domain, 2], for axiom C would be violated. Hence, there can be no General Event Structure whose domain of con gurations (or, at least, the compact elements thereof) is isomorphic to mul(N). This implies in particular that the Nielsen, Plotkin, Winskel unfolding in 10] is di erent from the Muller unfolding. This brings us to the main problem of this paper. Can we nd a generalized event structure which gives the Muller unfolding as its domain of con gurations? 3 A logical approach to causality
In this section we give a background sketch of the logical approach to causality. Our main purpose is to give some intuition for L 3 and to show that it can be rigorously de ned. The basis of the logical approach is that causality should be thought of as an observation on the state of a system. The observation indicates whether or not an event may occur. A logic of causality is then an appropriate language in which such observations can be stated. Following Winskel, we regard the state of a system as a con guration: \a set of events which have occurred by some stage in a process", 14, x1.1], Furthermore, we interpret the principle of nite causes in a strong form as a statement of completeness for a logic of causality: any two observations which agree on all nite states are equivalent.
The mathematical ingredients are as follows. Let E be a set of events and let Fin(E) denote the set of nite subsets of E. We seek logics L(E) which are equipped with a pairing j = L(E) Fin(E) between formulae in the logic and states of the system. We shall write this as s j = for s 2 Fin(E) and 2 L(E). This pairing tells us when an observation holds on the state s. Given such a pairing, an L-automaton, G = (E; ), is a pair consisting of a set of events E and a function : E ! L(E) which associates to each event its cause, considered as an observation in the logic. The behaviour of an L-automaton is described by the following As is customary, we consider only those states which are reachable from the initial state, ;. Strictly speaking the domain of con gurations as de ned here includes only the compact elements. We can recover the full domain by taking a directed completion, 13, x9], if necessary, but we shall work only with the compact elements in this paper. The reader should note that the full domains are not Scott domains, in general.
These constructions are parametric in the choice of logic. Given any logic for which a notion of observation pairing has been de ned, we get a corresponding class of automata whose behaviour is given uniformly by (5).
The remainder of this section leads up to the de nition of L 3 . We shall rst de ne L 1 and thereby explain the close relationship between logics of causality and topology, which is an essential feature of our approach. We shall then mention L 2 , and state its relationship to Winskel's General Event Structures. This should make clear the sense in which L-automata are generalized event structures. Finally, we shall use topological methods to de ne L 3 .
For any logic L we can de ne the function : L(E) ! 2 F in(E) where ( ) = fs 2 Fin(E) j s j = g: (6) By the principle of nite causes, if ( 1 ) = ( 2 ), then we should regard 1 and 2 as indistinguishable observations. This indicates that the logics we want to nd can be regarded as collections of subsets of Fin(E).
The simplest observation that we can make is that a given event, e 2 E, has occurred. (By \occur" we mean that e 2 s, where s is the current state of the system.) We shall denote this observation by the same symbol, e. It is characterised by the rule s j = e if, and only if, e 2 s. It follows that (e) = fs j e 2 sg. If s 2 Fin(E) let s"= ft 2 Fin(E) j s tg. We can then write (e) = feg". A subset x Fin(E) is upwards closed if s" x whenever s 2 x.
In particular, (e) is upwards closed. Let Fin(E)" denote the set of upwards closed subsets of Fin(E). It is easy to see that this is a topology; in fact, it is the smallest topology which contains the sets feg", for each e 2 E. It is called the Alexandrov topology on Fin(E), 13 , Example 3.6.2], and it is our rst candidate for a logic of causality: L 1 (E) = Fin(E)". 
We shall always write automata in this way: the left-hand column has the events while the right-hand column has the corresponding observations. This example is isomorphic to the parallel switch in 14, Example 1. The negation is then given by : = ! F. It is not di cult to show that for L 1 this negation is completely trivial: for any 2 Fr(E), if 6 = F then : = F, 3]. This con rms the con ict-free nature of L 1 .
It is not straightforward to nd causal logics with a non-trivial negation and a tractable axiomatic basis, 3, 4] . This is the central problem in the logical approach to causality. The di culty arises because Heyting implication is a secondary operation in a frame: it is not preserved by the frame homomorphisms. If we considered it to be a primary operation and required homomorphisms to preserve it then the resulting category|of complete Heyting algebras| would no longer be algebraic and free objects would no longer exist, 7, I.4.10]. What this means for us is that we cannot simply throw in a negation and expect to generate logics by algebraic methods as we did above for L 1 .
One possibility is to push the negation out of the logic and into the semantics of the observation pairing. Let L 2 (E) = Fr(E) Fr(E) consist of the language of pairs of observations from L 1 Let : Fr(E E) ! 2 F in(E) . It is clear that is a frame epimorphism onto L 3 (E). Hence, frame theory tells us that there exists some set of relations in Fr(E E) such that
is an isomorphism of frames.
But what are the relations? It is not hard to see that e^e = F and e _ e = T in L 3 (E): an event cannot both be in s and not be in s while any event must either be in s or not be in s.
Hence e and e are complements of each other, 7, I.1.6], and therefore :e = e. We have found a non-trivial negation which does the right thing on the basic observations. If E is nite, then it is proved in 3] that :
Fr(E E) < e^e = F; e _ e = T > ?! 2
is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras. Hence, L 3 (E) is the free Boolean algebra on E. (The frame presentation corresponds to disjunctive normal form.) Unfortunately, life is not so straightforward when E is in nite, which is the case of interest to us here. It is not hard to see that W i2I e i = T in L 3 (E) for any in nite subset of events fe i j i 2 Ig: any in nite subset of events must contain some event which does not occur in a given nite subset. The topology we have constructed has a surpisingly complex presentation as a frame when E is in nite.
In particular, L 3 (E) is not a classical logic when E is in nite! The negation does not obey both de Morgan laws and :: 6 = . (The signi cance of intuitionism arising in this context is discussed further in 3].) Luckily, one of the de Morgan laws holds in any Heyting algebra:
:( _ ) = : ^: , 7, I.1.11], and this is su cient for the purposes of the next section. We shall spare the reader from any further details of the axiomatics of L 3 (E). A full account may be found in 3].
With this background regarding L 3 in place, we can nally embark upon the main construction.
Capturing the Muller unfolding
Let N = (B; A; F; M 0 ) be a nite 1-safe Petri net. The rst step is to determine the events of our automaton. It is natural to take these to represent the rings of transitions since, after all, that is what is counted in mul(N). Let N denote the positive natural numbers. Our events will be elements of A N , written as a i , which should be thought of as representing the i-th ring of transition a.
The observations corresponding to these events are harder to write down. Consider a place u in the net N and those transitions which are incident on it as shown below. ? ? @ @ R P P P P P q x y @ @ R ? ?
Here, u = fx; yg and u = fa; b; cg. We shall regard (7) 
The following conventions will be used to interpret (8):
x 0 = T; 8x 2 A; V ; = T and W ; = F.
Note that, because N is nite, (a n ) 2 L 3 . The reader's attention is drawn to the discrepancy between the restrictions on the indices i; j|corresponding to transitions in u|which are required to be only non-negative, and the indices k; l|corresponding to transitions in u | which must always be positive. These restrictions and the discrepancy between them are important to the correct working of (8) . The example net in (3) (8) arises, consider the behaviour of the net in the vicinity of the place illustrated in (7) . Assume that this place, u, is not marked in the initial marking so that M 0 (u) = 0 and (u) = 2. (The reader will easily be able to supply a similar argument when u is marked initially.) In order that u becomes marked at some point it is necessary that the number of times x and y have red, in total, should exceed by 1 the number of times a, b and c have red, in total. (Notice that we have just made use of the fact that N is 1-safe.) Suppose that x and y have red i and j times respectively, and that b and c are about to re for the k-th and l-th times, respectively. Suppose further that a is about to re for the n-th time. If u is marked, it then follows from what was said above that i + j = n ? 1 + k ? 1 + l ? 1 + 1; which we may rewrite as i + j = n + k + l ? (u) . This is exactly the constraint which appears under the disjunction in (8) . The term within the disjunction tries to capture the fact that x i and y j have occurred while neither b k nor c l has. In order for a to be able to re, all its places must be marked, which accounts for the outermost conjunction in (8) .
This discussion does not prove anything; it merely suggests that (8) is a necessary consequence of the ring rule for the given interpretation of the events a i . Note, in particular, that (a n ) makes no mention of a n?1 . It is not at all obvious from (8) that A(N) o ers the events a i in order of increasing i. This precedence is required by the interpretation we have given to the a i : it would be unfortunate, to say the least, if the second ring of a took place before the rst ring of a! It is instructive to consider a pathological situation where this does in fact arise, which has to be excluded from the main theorem. Consider the net with only a single transition, a, and no places. Since a = ;, the conventions above imply that the net has the automaton a n T which allows any of the events a n to occur initially. This clearly does not generate the Muller unfolding. This net behaves as though there were a place in the preset of a with an in nite number of tokens which suggests that the pathology is related to what goes wrong in non-safe nets. This falls outside the scope of the present paper. Our concern here is to exclude such examples from the statement of the theorem. If N is 1-safe then a transition a with a = ; must also have a = ;. Since we deal only with 1-safe nets, it is su cient to require that no transition is isolated, 12, x1.5].
Before giving a precise statement of the main theorem we need to identify the underlying function which induces the isomorphism. The proof of this is more di cult than one might expect. We are only able to sketch the outlines of the argument here; full details appear in 6]. The proof falls naturally into two parts: what happens initially and what happens after some sequence of transitions have red. The rst part is straightforward and we give its proof in full to give a avour for the kind of arguments which are used. Proof: Suppose that a 2 A is enabled at M 0 . Choose u 2 a which we may always do since N is 1-safe and no transition of N is isolated. Since N is 1-safe, M 0 (u) = 1 and (u) = ju j.
Suppose as usual that the vicinity of the place u is described by the picture (7). According to (8) , the contribution of u to (a 1 ) looks like _ i+j=k?1+l?1
Consider the sub-term = (x 0^y0 )^:(b 1 _ c 1 ) = :(b 1 _ c 1 ) which satis es the restrictions imposed by (8) . Clearly, ; j = . Since we can nd such a sub-term for any u 2 a, it is clear that ; j = (a 1 ) Now suppose that ; j = (a n ) in A(N). Choose u 2 a, which, as above, we may always do.
It follows from (8) The proof of this reduces easily to the case where s = e for some e 2 A, which then follows from a careful case analysis. Proposition 4.2, in conjunction with Proposition 4.1, allows us to work out whether or not A(N) will o er a n , after N has o ered s. This gives us su cient information, inductively, to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1. We hope that this brief sketch has given the reader some idea of how the proof works.
Conclusion
The eld of asynchronous circuit design has undergone a great resurgence in recent years, 1]. We believe that the concurrency theorist can nd many interesting questions to look at in this application area and we hope that our version of Muller's construction will set a precedent for this. The logic of causality, L 3 , which we have introduced here is successful at dealing with the complexities of the Muller construction but its axiomatic basis is itself very complex. It seems unlikely that L 3 is the optimal logic of causality, if such a thing exists at all. Is there a better or simpler one|and corresponding event structures|which could accomplish the same task? Questions like this make us realise that causality is still a largely unexplored subject, full of di cult and fascinating problems. Perhaps the results of this paper will spur others towards attacking some of them.
